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### PROTOCOLS TO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Mr. President, I rise in support of the Resolution of Ratification of the Protocol for the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, which we oftentimes refer to as the Washington Treaty.

On March 3, the Foreign Relations Committee, in a show of overwhelming bipartisan support, agreed to the resolution expanding NATO by a vote of 16-2. The decision of whether or not to enlarge NATO for a fourth time in its history is a momentous one. Unlike the admission of Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982, NATO now, for the first time, is proposing to welcome former members of the now-defunct Soviet-led Warsaw Pact Organization.

Mr. President, the rationale for favorable action on the resolution of ratification, in my view, is very clear. For political, economic, strategic, and cultural reasons, Europe remains an area of vital interest to the United States of America. We are a European power, and for our own safety's sake, in my view, we must remain a European power. Stability on that continent is fundamental to the well-being of our country and to our ability to move our assets and attention quickly to other parts of the world when necessary.

The primary purpose and benefit of NATO, since its inception in 1949, has been ensuring stability in democratic Europe by guaranteeing the territorial integrity of alliance members. I argue, Mr. President, that this focus continues. History shows us that when there is a vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, countries are forced to pursue their own

individual security arrangements. We saw that before and after World War I. Enlargement, Mr. President--and this is a central reason why I believe it is in our interest to enlarge NATO, to embrace the three countries in question--will preclude a repeat of the developments in post-World War I. Enlargement will extend the zone of stability and help eliminate the gray area in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the prospect of enlargement has already had a positive impact on stability by stimulating internal reforms in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic and encouraging them to resolve historic disputes with their neighbors.

Mr. President, prior to Poland being offered the opportunity to join NATO, there was a question of whether or not the military controlled the military or civilians controlled the military in Poland. They made a very difficult political decision of doing what was stipulated in the Perry requirements--that is, the requirements set forth by former Secretary of Defense Perry--for expansion of NATO, and what all other NATO nations have done, which is to guarantee that there is civilian control of the military. I respectfully suggest that that action would not have been taken but for moving into NATO.

The three applicants for NATO membership before us have resolved long and historic border disputes such as those between Poland and Germany, and Hungary and Romania. Romania, also hoping to become a member of the NATO, has for the first time in modern history reached an agreement for the equitable treatment of its Hungarian minority. I could cite you example upon example in Central and Eastern Europe

where actions have been taken as a consequence of even the prospect of NATO membership. This prospect, of being anchored to the West, has caused many countries in that region to accord their behavior with international norms that we believe are minimum requirements for countries with whom we wish to be allied. So the process of NATO enlargement has already had, in my view, a very stabilizing impact on Europe.

Numerous witnesses before our committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, have made a compelling case for NATO enlargement. They have not only made it to our committee, Mr. President, but to the committees on which you serve; they have made compelling cases of

the strategic value of embracing the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians as our allies in NATO in the Intelligence Committee and the Armed Services Committee, as well. They talked about the qualifications for NATO membership and the fact that they will be net contributors to the alliance that we call NATO .

My colleagues who vote for this resolution should, however, be clear about the costs. I realize that some outside groups who support NATO expansion, because they know I am such a champion of expansion and that I speak around the country about it, will say don't talk so much about the cost, because obviously the cost could be an Achilles' heel for enlargement. But I believe, Mr. President, as I said earlier, no foreign policy can be sustained, no matter how well conceived, without the informed consent of the American people. I think that one thing that your generation and mine learned about Vietnam, whatever other lesson we take away from Vietnam, is that without the informed consent of the American people, no policy can last.

Part of the informed consent is to be honest and straightforward with the American people about the obligations we will be undertaking financially, politically, and militarily if we expand NATO . For what I do not want to see happen--it would be tragic--is to enlarge NATO , and 2 years later when the bill comes due, for colleagues who voted for expansion to say, 'Wait, I didn't know it was going to

cost me more money; I am not going to vote for more money.' Such a turn of events would exacerbate the always-present burdensharing debate within NATO , and could harm alliance cohesion. So I think it is important, Mr. President, that we be frank with ourselves about the costs. I look forward to debating my colleagues on what I think are very manageable costs, with benefits that far exceed any cost that expansion will entail.

My colleagues who vote for the resolution should know what these costs are. They are real, but they are manageable. The most recent NATO estimates, which I will be talking about in great detail as this debate unfolds, calculate that direct costs to the United States will be roughly \$40 million a year over the next 10 years. That is \$400 million over the next 10 years. That is what it will cost, our direct costs, to bring these three applicants into the alliance. This reflects a realistic assessment of the state of the military infrastructure in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary and the threats that presently face NATO , which in a military sense are virtually nonexistent. It also reflects an equitable sharing of the burden among the existing 16 NATO members.

In fact, a condition which the Foreign Relations Committee set forth in the resolution of ratification states, in effect, if there is not an equitable burdensharing arrangement, don't count us in. For example, I served with one of this nation's great Senators, Russell Long from Louisiana, who was chairman of the Finance Committee. I remember going up to him one day on the floor--I don't think he would mind my saying this--I walked up to him and said, 'Mr. Chairman, I would like your help' on such and such a piece of legislation. It was in the Finance Committee. He looked at me--and those of you who served with him know he used to put his arm around your neck--and he said, 'Joe, as my uncle used to say, I ain't for any deal I ain't in on.'

The truth of the matter is, if we want the American people in on this deal, we have to let them know what the costs are, what it's going to be. We also have to, frankly, let our allies know what we expect of them and what portion of the cost we are contemplating they will carry. So that's why the resolution that the Senator from Nebraska and I helped report out of our

committee specifies that the burdensharing must be equitable. And we go on in legislative language in the committee report to explain what we mean by that. But, again, I will come back to that point and many others that I will raise today as we continue this debate.

Many have raised the possibility that enlargement of NATO may damage our relations with Russia. Mr. President, I believe very strongly, as one Senator who has spent a lot of time dealing with these foreign policy issues--which doesn't qualify me for anything other than knowing the arguments--that the single most important bilateral relationship our country has to deal with and nurture over the next decade is that with Russia. If Russia moves into the mode of being a democratic republic with a market economy, that bodes very well for us and our ability to deal with Russia and the rest of the world. If Russia turns into an absolute failure--something approaching the aftermath of the Weimar Republic--where totalitarian government re-emerges and militarism takes hold--that is very bad for us, and it is very bad for the world. So I take very seriously those Senators--and I count myself as one of them--who look at this enlargement of NATO, not solely, but in part, through the prism of how will this affect the single most important relationship we have, in my view, with another country.

I come to a very different conclusion from some of the critics. I believe that the guaranteed stability in Central Europe that will be brought about as a consequence of expansion will enhance Russian security rather than diminish Russian security. I spent a great deal of time speaking with our Russian counterparts in the Duma, as well as with every leader of the four or five major factions in Russia--from true Democrats to old apparatchiks--and not a single solitary person I spoke with in Moscow believed that Russian security was diminished by the expansion of NATO. Not a single one viewed it as a threat. None of them liked it. Views ranged from seeing it as a slap in the face to a reflection of the attitude of the West that we never wanted Russia to be part of the West. Neither is true. Both are understandable. This is a nation that, as my mother would say, has fallen from grace, fallen very far--a superpower that is on the balls of their heels right now and feeling very, very put

upon--a proud nation that has lost its empire.

I am not suggesting that we have to do anything that would allow them to regain their empire, but I am suggesting that it is not difficult to understand their present thinking. I want to make it clear that I don't believe anyone can give me any proof or evidence that the enlargement of NATO to include these three countries in any way is likely to alter Russian behavior because Moscow now believes its security interests are in greater jeopardy than they were before. I do not believe there is any credible evidence to sustain that assertion, an assertion you will hear made over and over again by opponents of expansion on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

As I said, I do not dismiss the concerns that have been raised by my colleagues in this regard. But that is the very reason why I enthusiastically back the NATO-Russian Founding Act. The Founding Act, signed by Russia and NATO's Secretary General Javier Solana in the name of NATO, negotiated a consultative relationship with Russia on what we call 'transparency.' In this agreement, NATO basically says, 'Hey, Russia, look. This is what we are doing. We don't intend it as a threat to you. It is not an offensive threat to you. And, to prove it to you, we will let you take a look at what we are doing.' That is smart negotiating. That is smart business. That makes good sense.

This act, which Russia signed formally with NATO--not just with us, with NATO--laid out how the alliance would give the Russians access to information. So that there was no reason for them to believe that we were doing anything as an offensive against them. To ensure Russian confidence that threat is not the rationale behind our action.

I note parenthetically that one of my colleagues said to me at lunch, 'Joe, I just spoke with a Russian ambassador, and he says that we refused to promise what they wanted us to promise--that we would never station additional forces and/or equipment and/or nuclear weapons on the soil of these three countries, and therefore we are engaged in a breach of good faith.' That is somewhat disingenuous, if that is what was said, and if I understood it correctly. Russia asked us to formally commit that we would not do

that. We cannot formally commit to that. We cannot yield our sovereignty decisions to another nation.

But what we did say was that this alliance--and what all of the Presidents of each of the three applicant countries fully understand--has no intention, no plans, no requirement, and there is no request from any of the applicant countries that NATO forces be stationed on their soil. Further, we said that there was no need for conventional equipment of an offensive nature to be forward-based on their soil or for nuclear weapons to be placed on their soil. We have committed that we will not do that. We have not, nor should we ever, commit that in writing to another power.

Militarily speaking, what this expansion is going to require of us, as well as the Poles and the 15 other nations, along with the Czech Republic and Hungary, is the time and money to upgrade the applicants' military infrastructure. This means bringing up to NATO standards the runways, the hangars, the storage depots, the fuel depots, et cetera, as contingencies against an offensive action against these countries in the future by someone else. But upgrading infrastructure against a possible exterior threat is a distinction with a gigantic difference.

NATO enlargement has been facilitated greatly by this Founding Act. In fact, the text of the resolution of ratification puts the Senate on record as supporting the Founding Act while restating the supremacy of the North Atlantic Council and advocating a new and constructive relationship with Russia.

I know all of my colleagues on the floor know what the North Atlantic Council is. But since I am talking about the informed consent of the American people--and I hope they are listening--the North Atlantic Council is that mechanism whereby the designated representatives of the leaders of each of the 16 NATO countries meet and make policies, where they make the decisions. And Russia has no voice within that organization, nor should they, nor should any non-NATO member have a voice within that organization. But that is very different from saying that the North Atlantic Council should not reassure, if it chooses to do so, Russia, or any other nation, that we have no ill intent by what we do, allowing them to see, allowing them literally to have

offices in a similar complex to be able to see what we are about.

Those of you who are students of history, as I am--and it is sort of my avocation--would not disagree about the point made by some historians that World War I occurred in part as a consequence of a mistake, a mobilization that was meant to be a response but

was viewed as an offensive. And things started unraveling. If there had been 'transparency,' we may never have gotten to the point where the war started the way it did, and when it did, and where it did.

So NATO enlargement, as I said, Mr. President, is a historic opportunity for the United States to set a positive course upon a situation in Europe, Russia, and the neighboring countries that is dynamic and fluid. Voting to enlarge NATO now, in my view, expands the zone of stability eastward, embracing those dynamic forces of positive change, giving them a chance to take hold and bear fruit in the future.

I don't know whether your parents as you grew up had the same expressions that mine had. I will bet that if you sit down and give me 2, 3, or 5 expressions that your mother or father used more than 100 times, we could all come up with something. One of them that was heard in my family was, 'Sometimes it is better to have a direction and move than to have no idea what you want to do.' Part of what we are doing here is giving direction to a fluid European security situation where no one can predict with any degree of certainty what is going to happen in Russia any more than they could guarantee the future of Romania, Poland, or any country in Central or Eastern Europe. But absent a structure, absent a framework, plan, a well thought out architecture, the likelihood of greater mistakes and more mistakes being made increases, in my opinion.

So I go back to the central theme that my colleagues will hear me speak to time and again. Expanding the zone of stability into the gray area of Central and Eastern Europe is in the interest of all countries, including Russia. For the last thing, it seems to me that you would want, if you were a Russian leader is instability to your West. In saying this, I do not presume to tell another politician what is in his

interest, or to tell another country what is in its interest. But I would respectfully suggest that if any of us were the leader of Russia, we would much prefer that there be peace and stability between Poland and Germany, Poland and Belarus, and Romania and Hungary, and so on and so on. Instability

works against Russian interests as well as our own. This is a place where conscience and convenience cross paths, in my view.

Mr. President, for all of those reasons, I believe that there is an overwhelming case for the bottom-line value to America of expanding NATO . Inevitably, however, the qualitative new situations surrounding the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have occasioned serious questions, which I will attempt to deal with shortly.

Before I turn to them, I thought I should dispel one procedural claim that has resurfaced in recent days. That claim alleges that there has been insufficient discussion of NATO enlargement to warrant the issues being considered by the full Senate at this time. That is the tactic, I say to the chairman of the full committee, Senator Helms, which we find those who oppose our position keep falling back to--a different strategy. First the tactic. I should say 'tactic' rather than 'strategy.' It was a frontal assault--which is their right, and I respect it--to stop expansion. I think they believe and have concluded that the momentum was too strong to do that.

Then the next tactic was, Well, what we will do is we will not be able to fight expansion, but let's set conditions to expansion that could not be realistic, nor should necessarily be fulfilled before there is admission--conditions, I might add, we never set on the four previous occasions we enlarged NATO . Then when that looked like it might take hold--we don't know until we count the votes--but when that didn't seem to be gaining fervor, the part of the foreign policy community which I would argue is a minority of the community, including some of our well respected former colleagues who disagree with expansion, and some of our well respected present colleagues who disagree with our position, decided on a new tactic, and that was to argue that we just have not given sufficient time to debate this issue, so why doesn't the

majority leader postpone the consideration of this for an indefinite period so we can really debate it.

I asked one of the newspapers who made that argument--a reporter for one of the newspapers; he

doesn't set the policy. I said, 'I found it fascinating that you want an open and thorough debate. Your paper talked about the need for that. And yet, when the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee'--I will document this in a moment--'had hours and hours of hearings on this subject and finally voted on the resolution, it appeared in a small box below a Monica Lewinsky story. I don't quite get this.' Do you know what this person told me? He told my press person, 'Well, another major paper in America put it on the front page. We will wait until we get to the debate and final vote.'

Now, look. You can't have it both ways. This is not a subject that is going to get my mom at home saying, 'Joey, I am so glad you are working on NATO . I think you should do that. Put aside Social Security. Don't worry about that. And put aside Medicare. Don't worry about that. And, by the way, education.' Americans don't think that way, they never have, about foreign policy. They have enough trouble figuring out how to put food on the table, sending their kids to school, how to pay the medical bills, and how to keep their jobs.

So this notion that in the past we have had these debates about foreign policy where everything has come to a halt and all of America is focused on it, and all have been heard, that only occurs in times of crises. God forbid, were there an attack on NATO , it would be the focus of everyone in America. But it was not the focus even when Vandenberg was debating NATO in the late forties and before we voted

on it. It is very hard to be proactive in a foreign policy initiative that is going to capture the imagination of the American people. And it is not because they are not interested; it is because they are urgently attending to many other things. That is one of the reasons I think we have a representative government. I think that is one of the reasons why they look to us. I think that is part of our job description.

So to the extent that we could generate discussion and interest about this, I respectfully suggest under the leadership of Chairman Helms of the Foreign Relations Committee, we have in fact engaged in a serious debate thus far. The closer we get to this final resolution, the more the public will focus on it. In fact, few foreign policy issues have been scrutinized as closely or as openly in public session as this has been in the 25 years that I have been here.

Beginning in 1994, the examination of the question of NATO enlargement by the Committee on Foreign Relations has been a well thought out and bipartisan effort. The committee's first hearings on NATO enlargement took place early in 1994. More hearings were held in 1995, and since October of 1997 the Foreign Relations Committee, under Chairman Helms' leadership, has had no fewer than 8 extensive hearings, for a total of 12 in all. One of those hearings was held last fall and featured testimony from 15 American citizens, many of whom represent grassroots civics groups interested in NATO .

I would like to publicly commend the Senator, who is on the floor now, Senator Helms, for the strong and able leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee in building bipartisan support for membership of these three candidate countries and for helping to craft a bipartisan resolution for the protocols of accession.

It is also important to note that three other Senate committees--the Armed Services Committee, the Appropriations Committee, and the Budget Committee--have also held hearings on NATO enlargement. The Armed Services Committee filed a report with the Foreign Relations Committee recommending certain understandings which the Foreign Relations Committee has taken into account in developing the resolution of ratification of the protocols of accession that we voted out 16 to 2.

The Intelligence Committee filed a report that favorably assesses the intent and ability of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to protect classified military and intelligence information which would be provided them as NATO members--something we are all concerned about. We have not taken this thing on face value or willy-nilly. We had the committee of jurisdiction thoroughly look at it. They concluded that they would in fact be trustworthy members.

From the very outset of 1994, the Foreign Relations Committee made certain that voices in favor of NATO enlargement as well as voices against enlargement would be heard equally and fairly. I believe this decision was essential for the committee members to get all sides of the argument. I will not go into the details at this moment of which witnesses addressed which arguments except to say

that a glance at the list of witnesses reflects the extraordinary effort we made at balance. Many of the leaders of both the proenlargement and antienlargement camps were represented before our committee. And 2 months ago, in mid-January, the Committee on Foreign Relations published a 552-page document entitled: 'The Debate on NATO Enlargement.' The compendium contained the full testimonies of witnesses from the seven hearings of the committee from October to November of 1997, questions from members of the committee and witnesses' responses and a good deal of additional material received for the record. It included the reprinting of lengthy articles against enlargement by Dr. Michael Mandelbaum, of Johns Hopkins University, one of the leading opponents of enlargement, and the report of a factfinding trip that I took late last year to Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, to give you the extent, and a lot more is covered. I am not suggesting that my report is any more or less significant than what Dr. Mandelbaum or anyone else testified to, but I am making the larger point that it is extensive.

Mr. President, it is possible that some aspects of the NATO enlargement question are not covered in this 552-page compendium, but I do not know of any, and I have spent, along with my colleagues in the Chamber, literally hundreds of hours attempting to educate myself on this subject, with 25 years of experience. The document I have referred to was sent to all 100 Senators with an accompanying letter from Senator Helms and me.

In short, all the issues have been out there for a long time for any interested party to study. Moreover, the legislative record of the Senate testifies to a longstanding engagement with NATO enlargement. In 1994, 1995 and 1996 the Senate debated and approved legislation in favor of NATO enlargement. On July 25, 1996, by an 81-to-16 vote, the Senate approved legislation stating that 'The admission to NATO of emerging democracies in central and Eastern Europe, which are found to be in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty, would contribute to international peace and contribute to the security of the region.'

Last April, by agreement, the majority leader, Senator

Lott, and the minority leader, Senator Daschle, established the NATO Senate observer group to facilitate close interaction with the executive branch as plans for NATO enlargement went forward.

Now, I cite this only to demonstrate that not only have we gone out of our way to look at the arguments for and against, but this group that was set up with Senator Roth, my senior colleague from Delaware, and me as the cochairs, that traveled with the President--not just the two of us but others, including the Senator from Nebraska--spent an inordinate amount of time with the administration, whether it was with the National Security Adviser, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the President himself, or the Vice President, so that we knew what was going on during the negotiations relative to who might be invited.

On July 25, 1996, by a vote of 81 to 16, the Senate approved legislation stating that 'Admission to NATO of emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, which are found to be in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty, would contribute to international peace and contribute to the security of

the region.'

I repeat that for a second time because that was back in July of 1996. Last April, as I indicated, the leaders of both parties set up this NATO observer group. Twenty-eight Senators, 14 in each party, were named to the observer group, and as I said, Senator Roth has demonstrated a strong commitment and leadership as chairman of this group. Since then, the observer group has held no fewer than 17 meetings with the administration, NATO and other foreign officials. Members met with President Clinton, Secretaries Albright and Cohen, National Security Adviser Berger, and many other high ranking civilian and military officials. Members of the Senate NATO observer group have met with the Presidents of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and their Foreign Ministers. They have met with NATO's Secretary General Solana; they have met with NATO Chiefs of Defense, and the chairman of the NATO military committee. Some have actually met and addressed the NATO PermRep group that met here earlier in the year. We have met with the chiefs of staff of each of the present NATO members. There have been significant encounters.

The observer group was represented in a delegation to the signing of the Founding Act between NATO and Russia in Paris in May of 1997. The Senate observer group was also represented in the U.S. delegation to the NATO summit in Madrid in July, and I would like to repeat that 28 Senators are members of this observer group.

When we add to that the number of other Senators who are members of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations and Budget Committees, all of which have held hearings on NATO enlargement, we find that no fewer than 74 Senators have been exposed more than tangentially to the issue of NATO enlargement through one or more committees or the



Senate NATO observer group--nearly three-quarters of the entire Senate. That is quite a remarkable fact, which I submit definitely puts to rest the charge that this issue lacks study.

I challenge any of my colleagues to name me another major issue where 75 Members of the Senate have gotten themselves, through specific assignments, more involved in the details. To me, it is abundantly clear that consideration of the Resolution of Ratification of NATO enlargement upon which we are embarked today is the culmination of several years of detailed scrutiny and debate within the Senate. As a matter of fact, my good friend and worthy opponent on occasion, although we agree more than we disagree, the distinguished senior Senator from Virginia and I, even as long ago as last--I don't know how long ago it was now--found ourselves debating before a group of very distinguished--it wasn't an intended debate, but we ended up with, I thought, an informative and thoughtful debate before a group of leading citizens in the State of Connecticut at the behest of our friend, Senator Dodd. So we are not new to this, Mr. President, notwithstanding the fact this will be news to some members of the press and it will be news to some members of the public. But the notion that we have not taken it seriously and it needs more time, I think, is unfounded.

That is not to suggest that it would not warrant taking a lot of time in the Chamber. I think that is totally appropriate because this is ultimately the forum where the folks actually get a look at what we are doing. No one followed us to Madrid or to Paris. No one was involved in that room in the Dirksen Building when the Senator and I exchanged views before a group of Connecticut voters. But the truth of the matter is this is the forum to do that. And knowing my friend from Virginia, who is on his feet and in the Chamber, it will be spirited and it will be an informative debate, at least from his perspective, from his side of the argument.

Mr. President, I think it is abundantly clear the consideration of the NATO resolution of ratification for enlargement upon which we have embarked today is a culmination of several years of detailed scrutiny and debate within the Senate. I would like, now, to turn to some of the arguments against enlargement or

for qualifications on enlargement, and then explain why I do not find them very convincing.

Some say that since the Soviet Union is but a dead memory, some would suggest a bad memory, that there are no longer any threats to democratic Europe. Others maintain that because the Pacific rim and Latin America have gained in importance, we should scale down our commitment of resources to Europe and devote them more to the Pacific rim.

Some of my colleagues worry that NATO enlargement may strengthen the nationalists and Communists, the Reds and the browns, within Russia and draw new dividing lines in Europe. Recently, fears have been voiced that NATO enlargement is open-ended and, hence, out of control. Opponents of NATO's involvement in Bosnia see it as an open-ended and dangerous model for future out-of-area NATO commitments, an expression put forward in a very articulate manner by my colleague from Missouri who is on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Finally, on an issue that concerns us all, opponents assert that the cost NATO enlargement is going to require is not clear at best and exorbitant probably. Some fear that the cost of enlargement will fall disproportionately on the United States. All of these arguments against are important and, I submit, can be answered satisfactorily, but clearly must be answered.

I submit, first of all, without minimizing the importance of Asia and Latin America, that Europe remains the vital area of interest to the United States for political, strategic, economic and, yes, cultural reasons. A sizable percentage of the world's democracies are in Europe, and the continent remains a major global economic player and a partner of the United States.

In economic terms, the European Union, with a combined population a third larger than ours, has a combined GDP that exceeds ours. While the United States has a larger and, I might add, less balanced trading relationship with Asia than with Europe, we invest more in Europe. In fact, we have more direct investments in Europe than in any other area of the world, an amount in excess of \$250 billion.

Several new democracies in Central and Eastern

Europe have highly educated work forces and, as President Clinton said in his message of transmittal of the protocols of accession, they 'have helped to make Central Europe the continent's most robust zone of economic growth.'

The three candidate countries already attract considerable American investment. Moreover, most Americans trace their cultural roots to Europe and millions retain personal ties to it. By any geographical standard, it would be a catastrophe for U.S. interests if instability would alter the current situation in Europe.

How might that instability occur, Mr. President? No one believes that the Russian Army is poised to pour through the Fulda Gap in Germany, NATO's horror scenario for 45 years. The Russian Army is in such pitiful shape that it could not even reconquer little Chechnya, a part of the Russian Federation.

Nonetheless, some say that someday Russia will regain her military might, and if democratization there does not succeed, NATO might, once again, be democratic Europe's insurance policy against reemergence of a hegemonic power, as is outlined in declaration 2 of the resolution of ratification.

For the foreseeable future, however, the primary threats to stability in Europe are different, although no less real, than those of the cold war. We all know what they are. They are ethnic and religious hatred, as horrifyingly shown in the hundreds of thousands killed, raped, made homeless, and brutalized in Bosnia and most recently in Kosovo. They are the well-organized forces of international crime, whose tentacles extend from Moscow and Palermo to New York and Los Angeles. The history of the 20th century has demonstrated that the United States must--and I emphasize 'must'--play a leading role in organizing the security of Europe.

In World War I and World War II, and lately in Bosnia and Herzegovina, without American leadership, the countries of Europe have been unable to resolve their differences peacefully. While American idealism has certainly played a role in our various interventions to rescue Europe, enlightened self-interest has been our dominant motive.

Put simply, it is in the vital interest of the United States of America that stability be preserved in Europe, not only because Europe itself is of central importance, but also in order that, when necessary, we are free to concentrate our assets on problems in other areas of the world.

How does this need for security in Europe translate into 1998 terms? It means that we must lead the Europeans to create what is called in the current foreign policy jargon a new security architecture of interlocking organizations with NATO at its core. Of primary importance is that this policy will guarantee stability to Central Europe, where newly independent states are striving to create and solidify political democracy and free markets. This is a very difficult process, subject to destabilizing forces like ethnic antagonisms, economic downturns, international crime, and, in some cases, thinly disguised foreign pressure. It is in this context that the enlargement of NATO must be seen.

During the cold war, NATO provided the security umbrella under which former enemies, like France and Germany, were able to cooperate and build highly successful free societies. It was the framework under which former pariahs, like Germany, Italy, and Spain, could be reintegrated into democratic Europe. And it was NATO that on several occasions helped keep the feud between Greece and Turkey from escalating into full warfare.

The enlargement of NATO can now serve to move that zone of stability eastward to Central Europe and thereby deter external destabilization, prevent ethnic conflicts from escalating, and forestall a scramble for new bilateral-multilateral pacts along the lines of the 1930s from occurring in the 1990s and the next century. This is the strategic rationale for enlargement laid out in detail in declaration 2 of the resolution of ratification. In fact, the zone of stability is already developing.

As I mentioned earlier, in anticipation of NATO membership, several Central and East European countries have settled longstanding disputes. I need only mention Hungary and Romania, Slovenia and Italy, Germany and the Czech Republic, Poland and Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine, and there are other

examples I will go into detail about later. If NATO were not to enlarge, however, the countries between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to protect themselves. It is a certainty. The policy option for today is not, as it is often phrased, enlarge NATO or remain the same. The status quo is simply not an option over the next several years.

Mr. President, there is one additional argument for NATO enlargement which may have fallen out of fashion, and I am going to mention it now at the risk of engaging this debate in a different direction, and that is the moral argument--the moral argument.

For 40 years, the United States loudly proclaimed its solidarity with captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe who were under the heel of Communist oppressors--40 years. Now that most of them have cast off their shackles, it seems to me it is our responsibility to live up to our pledges to readmit them into the West through NATO and the European Union when they are fully qualified.

In my view, not to do so out of an excessive fear of antagonizing Russia would accord Moscow a special sphere of influence in Central Europe, essentially validating the division of Europe at Yalta. For me, such a course is unthinkable. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all made tremendous efforts to meet NATO's stringent membership requirements, and, based on my reckoning, they have succeeded.

Not even the opponents of enlargement can dispute that fact. Hence, as declaration 4 of the resolution of ratification reaffirms, the three new members will have all the rights, privileges, obligations, responsibilities, and protections that are afforded all other NATO members. There is no second-class citizenship in NATO.

Ironically, within the fruits of NATO's unparalleled success lie the seeds of its possible demise. Alliances are formed to fight wars or to deter them. Once the adversary is gone, unless alliances adapt to meet changing threats, they lose their *raison d'être*, they lose their reason for being. Thus, enlargement must be accompanied by a fine-tuning of NATO's so-called strategic

concept last revisited in 1991.

The alliance's primary mission, outlined in article 5 of the Washington Treaty of April 4, 1949, remains the same: treating an attack on one member as an attack on all and responding through the use of armed forces, if necessary.

Condition 1 of the resolution of ratification underscores that the core purpose of NATO remains collective defense. In addition, since the end of the cold war, non-article 5 missions, like peacekeeping, sometimes in cooperation with non-NATO powers, have become possible. The SFOR joint effort in Bosnia with Russia and several other non-NATO countries is an excellent example.

To the critics who see our involvement in Bosnia as a harbinger of future NATO peacekeeping engagements or, from their point of view, entanglements, I would only say the success in Bosnia will provide the best deterrent to future ethnic cleansers and aggressors and, thereby, reduce the likelihood that American troops will have to be used in combat in Europe.

Condition 1 of the resolution of ratification foresees article 4 missions on a case-by-case basis only when there is a consensus in NATO and that there is a threat to the security interests of the alliance members. Through briefings required by condition 1, the executive branch will have to keep the Senate informed of any discussions in NATO to change or revise their strategic concept.

Some critics might ask why the Europeans can't take care of their own problems. First of all, Europeans shoulder three-quarters of the common funded cost of NATO and furnish an even higher percentage of the alliance's troops. Both our current NATO allies and the candidate countries have agreed to shoulder their fair share of financial costs and all mutual obligations connected with enlargement.

In order to guarantee a continuation of this alliance burdensharing, condition 2 of the resolution of ratification mandates an annual report by the President containing detailed, country-specific data on the contributions of all NATO members. It also requires that the inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and

Hungary not increase the percentage share of the United States to the common budgets of NATO .

To my colleagues who are understandably concerned about possible hollowing out of our worldwide military capability--by that I mean they argue that expanding NATO and the additional resources required will require us to take military resources to other parts of the world, meaning they will have a hollow capability in other parts of the world, thereby, in an overall sense, reducing our security--those who are concerned about this possible hollowing out of our worldwide military capability, I draw your attention to another element of condition 2 of the resolution of ratification which directs the President to certify that NATO enlargement will not detract from the ability of the United States to meet or to fund its military requirements outside the NATO area.

I know that many of my colleagues are concerned about the enlargement's effect upon our erstwhile cold war enemy Russia. I firmly believe that NATO enlargement will not adversely affect U.S. relations with the Russian Federation. As I indicated earlier, I came to that conclusion following a trip to Moscow and several European capitals last year and subsequent discussions on that topic.

Although few Russians are fond of NATO enlargement, policymakers in Moscow have come to terms with the first round. Moreover, no Russian I met with, from Communist leader Zyuganov to liberal leader Yavlinsky to the nationalist leader Lebed, none of them believe that NATO enlargement constitutes a security threat to Russia.

In fact, nearly all politicians and experts with whom I met understood the nonaggressiveness implicit in NATO's two recent declarations on nuclear and conventional forces. In the famous 'three noes,' the alliance declared that it has no reason, intention, or plan in the current or foreseeable security environment to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states and no forces to do that, no forces, in the future.

Similarly, NATO stated that in the current environment, it would not permanently station substantial combat forces of the 16 members on

Polish, Czech or Hungarian soil. Rather, the Kremlin's public opposition to enlargement is largely--largely--a psychological question connected with the loss of empire, wounded pride and, most importantly, an uncertainty about Russia's place in the world of the 21st century. The Russian Ambassador in Washington reiterated this psychological problem in a newspaper article just last week.

As part of this uncertainty, most Russian leaders are worried about their country being marginalized, and as a result, they are eager to move forward with its bilateral relationship with the United States.

We must continue to engage Russia politically, militarily, economically, and culturally. Declaration 5 of the resolution of ratification specifically endorses this 'new and constructive relationship' with the Russian Federation.

The Clinton administration, together with our NATO allies, has already begun to do just that. The NATO-Russian Founding Act signed in Paris last May is a good start at binding Russia closer to the West and soothing its bruised feelings.

The Founding Act, however, in no way gives Moscow a decisionmaking role in NATO's core structures like the North Atlantic Council, as condition 3 of the resolution specifically explains.

The purely consultative mandate of the new NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council does not mean that it cannot evolve into a truly valuable mechanism for promoting mutual trust.

As Russian officials better understand that NATO is not a rapacious caricature of Soviet propaganda, but rather a defensive alliance and force for security and stability in Europe, their animosity toward the organization may dissipate. And by working together in the Permanent Joint Council, Russia can prove that it is a responsible partner for the West.

Through this mechanism and others, over time Moscow can come to realize that enlargement of NATO by moving the zone of stability eastward to Central Europe will increase her own security, not diminish it.

It is also essential that arms control agreements with Russia be ratified and expanded.

Of special importance is getting the state дума, their parliament, to ratify the START II treaty and then, together with the United States, to move on to further reductions in START III.

The statement last week made by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin that he would push for дума ratification of START II is another clear sign that NATO enlargement does not stand in the way of arms control.

The nationalist and Communist objections to START II predate even a discussion of NATO enlargement, and I might add that in my meeting with Chernomyrdin, even though he and I got into a heated discussion about Iran, he never once suggested that expanding NATO was going to diminish the prospects of ratification of START. I asked him, and others did, when he thought that would occur. Because it was a private meeting, I will not set the time or the date that he suggested. But I will assure you that he is of the

view that ratification will occur.

Now, how does that square with those who say that talk of expansion is going to kill arms control? I managed, along with significant assistance from my friend from the State of Oregon, the Chemical Weapons Convention. We were told if we ratified that, the дума would never, if we went ahead and invited these three nations to join NATO, they would never ratify it.

While we were together in Spain, if I am not mistaken, with the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser, the Secretary of Defense and the Presidents of 15 other NATO nations, the дума either at that moment or shortly thereafter, by an overwhelming vote, ratified that arms control agreement. And now Chernomyrdin--to our friends who believe that NATO expansion will be damaging and cite him and his predecessor as a casualty of the talk of expansion--sat in a room just across the hall, the door I am pointing to, last week and talked about his certainty that there will be a ratification of the START

agreement. As my brother would say, 'Go figure.' How does that justify the argument or make the case that this is going to kill cooperation with Russia on arms control?

The arguments against the START II predate any debate on NATO enlargement. The duma has shown, though, that it is willing to conclude agreements, as I have indicated, not only the Chemical Weapons Convention, but the Flank Document to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, or the so-called CFE agreement. All have been ratified.

Condition 3 of the resolution of ratification reaffirms that the ongoing CFE talks are a venue for further conventional arms control reductions, not the NATO -Russia Permanent Joint Council. Did you hear what I just said? That is an important, if I do say so myself, an important point. That is that if, in fact, Russia was determining everything through the prism of whether or not we are expanding NATO, why are they not insisting that further discussions on conventional arms be done through the NATO -Russia accord? Why are they continuing to use the mechanism that was in place? Why did they pass the Chemical Weapons Convention? Why does their Prime Minister believe they are going to ratify the START agreement? And even if they do not, why is he pushing it?

It is because they are wise enough to know it is not an offensive threat and wise enough to know that arms control agreements should be judged based upon whether, standing by themselves, they are in the interest of their country or not.

Although the Russians have all but officially acquiesced to the first round of NATO enlargement, they would, I acknowledge, have much more trouble with the admission in the future of some other countries in Europe, principally the Baltic states or Ukraine.

Critics of enlargement worry that the process is so open-ended that it is dangerous. It is true that the official policy of NATO as most recently enunciated in the 1997 Madrid summit, is the 'open door'--and that is the official, enunciated policy--and that membership in the alliance is open to any European state, any European state that is in a position to further

the principles of the NATO treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty, and to contribute to the security of the alliance as a whole.

But it is equally true, as declaration 7 of the resolution of ratification unambiguously states, that other than Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the United States has not consented to invite any other country to join NATO in the future.

Moreover, according to declaration 7, the United States will not support such an invitation unless the President consults with the Senate according to constitutional procedures and the prospective NATO member can fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership and its inclusion would serve the political and strategic interests of the United States.

This declaration, Mr. President, is crystal clear and not only refutes the critics of enlargement, but also obviates the need for any amendment that would impose an artificial pause upon the

enlargement process after this round.

Such a condition would not only be superfluous, but would also have serious negative practical consequences. It would slam the door in the face of the several countries that in good faith are adjusting their policies to meet NATO requirements.

It would also arbitrarily rule out admission of already qualified countries like Slovenia, a formal applicant, and Austria, which might reassess its neutrality after national elections next year.

The amendment that would postpone the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic until they are admitted to the European Union is also, in my view, fatally flawed. Declaration 6 of the resolution of ratification recognizes the EU as 'an essential organization for economic, political, and social integration of all qualified European countries into an undivided Europe' and encourages the EU to expand its membership.

My friend from Oregon, who is on the floor, and I share a number of common views related to this, one of which is we have been individually--to the best of

my knowledge, this is correct; and I will stand corrected, obviously, if I am not--either quietly chastising or publicly promoting our European friends to expand the EU membership. We think we have problems with American special interests. Well, in Europe it pales by comparison in terms of certain political groups within Europe who are not at all willing to expand. But it must expand.

So we do not argue with the need for the EU to expand. That is why in declaration 6 of the resolution of ratification, we cite the EU as an essential organization for economic, political, and social integration.

But the EU has a lengthy, complex admissions procedure, which employs criteria very different from those of NATO .

Let me end where I began. Why on Earth would the United States want to link fulfillment of our strategic goals to an organization in which we have no say and to which we do not even belong? Why would we do that? I do not understand that. Why would we say, yes, we know our interests are impacted upon. We are a European power. And the security architecture of Europe, whether you are for or against enlargement--we are all agreeing that is important. One of the reasons my friend from West Virginia is opposed is he says it will harm the security architecture. One of the reasons we are for it is we say it will enhance it.

Whether we are for or against it, why, in the Lord's name, would we say that whatever that architecture should be is going to be determined by an organization where we do not have a vote? I do not get that. I truly do not get that one.

Is that to say I do not think like the Senator from New York thinks, that the faster the EU is expanded, the more stability there will be in Europe? No. I agree with that. I agree with that. It is in our interest. It is also going to be a competitive problem down the road for us as well, but it is in our interest. But, my goodness, to say that the one thing we all agree on, NATO in its present form or altered state is the security architecture for Europe that is important to us, but its future we are going to yield to an economic

organization of which we are not a member and we have no vote--I find that absolutely incredible.

Now, I will end with this. This is my last statement, and I appreciate the indulgence of the colleagues. I warned my colleagues early on this was an opening statement and would take this long, and I am about to finish.

As for the argument that the addition of three new members would somehow render the alliance immobile in the face of all objective evidence, the Presiding Officer knows how this argument goes. My goodness, we have trouble enough getting 16 members together; adding 3 more, it will be harder to get consensus. This 'doing business by consensus,' means everyone signs on. Therefore, it will be a lot harder. Therefore, that is the argument against enlargement.

I might add, by the way, if we are looking for certainty, we would not have expanded beyond the United States. We would have had great difficulty expanding anyway. I do not disregard this argument but it does fly in the face of all objective evidence.

The three previous rounds of NATO enlargement did not damage the cohesiveness of NATO , and there is every indication that the Poles, the Czechs, and the Hungarians will be among America's most loyal allies. I will get myself in trouble for saying this, but were the French only as cooperative as the Hungarians. I pray the day comes that my French ancestors are as cooperative as are the Hungarians. Or, I doubt whether we will see the day when the internal differences between the Poles and the Hungarians, divided by other countries, separated by other countries, will have disagreements that equal those that exist within Greece and Turkey at the moment. These three new nations, if anything, will strengthen our position within NATO as well as strengthen NATO .

In considering the ratification of NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the Senate has a historic opportunity to enhance the security of the United States of America by extending the zone of stability and peace in Europe.

Mr. President, I look forward to our debate on this resolution of ratification, which I truly believe protects American interests and American leadership within NATO . At its base, you will detect, not from my friend from Virginia, I want to make this clear, but I predict to you on the floor, you will find an undercurrent here that really, if phrased correctly, would be stated this way: Why do we need NATO ? Much of the debate about expansion is really the debate about the efficacy and need of an organization, the one we have now.

I note parenthetically if my friends say why expand

NATO when there is no threat in Europe, I ask the rhetorical question, why continue to have NATO if there is no threat in Europe?

I see my friend from Virginia is on his feet. I welcome his comments or questions, but I will yield the floor to give anyone else an opportunity to speak, if they wish. But I want to make it clear to my friend I am not retreating from the field; I will stay here if he wishes to engage me.